7 April 1954, Washington DC, USA
Q. Robert Richards, Copley Press: Mr. President, would you mind commenting on the strategic importance of Indochina to the free world? I think there has been across the country some lack of understanding on just what it means to us.
The President: You have of course, both the specific and the general when you talk about such things.
First of all, you have the specific value of a locality in its production of materials that the world needs.
Then you have the possibility that many human beings pass under a dictatorship that is inimical to the free world.
Finally, you have broader considerations that might follow what you would call the "falling domino" principle. You have a row of dominoes set up, you knock over the first one, and what will happen to the last one is the certainty that it will go over very quickly. So you could have a beginning of a disintegration that would have the most profound influences.
Now, with respect to the first one, two of the items from this particular area that the world uses are tin and tungsten. They are very important. There are others, of course, the rubber plantations and so on.
Then with respect to more people passing under this domination, Asia, after all, has already lost some 450 million of its peoples to the Communist dictatorship, and we simply can't afford greater losses.
But when we come to the possible sequence of events, the loss of Indochina, of Burma, of Thailand, of the Peninsula, and Indonesia following, now you begin to talk about areas that not only multiply the disadvantages that you would suffer through loss of materials, sources of materials, but now you are talking about millions and millions and millions of people.
Finally, the geographical position achieved thereby does many things. It turns the so-called island defensive chain of Japan, Formosa, of the Philippines and to the southward; it moves in to threaten Australia and New Zealand.
It takes away, in its economic aspects, that region that Japan must have as a trading area or Japan, in turn, will have only one place in the world to go - that is, toward the Communist areas in order to live.
So, the possible consequences of the loss are just incalculable to the free world.
https://facultystaff.richmond.edu/~ebolt/history398/DominoTheory.html
Lyndon Johnson: 'We will stand in Vietnam', press conference escalating war - 1965
28 July 1965, Washington DC, USA
My fellow Americans:
Not long ago I received a letter from a woman in the Midwest. She wrote:
Dear Mr. President:
In my humble way I am writing to you about the crisis in Viet-Nam. I have a son who is now in Viet-Nam. My husband served in World War II. Our country was at war, but now, this time, it is just something that I don't understand. Why?"
Well, I have tried to answer that question dozens of times and more in practically every State in this Union. I have discussed it fully in Baltimore in April, in Washington in May, in San Francisco in June. Let me again, now, discuss it here in the East Room of the White House.
Why must young Americans, born into a land exultant with hope and with golden promise, toil and suffer and sometimes die in such a remote and distant place?
The answer, like the war itself, is not an easy one, but it echoes clearly from the painful lessons of half a century. Three times in my lifetime, in two World Wars and in Korea, Americans have gone to far lands to fight for freedom. We have learned at a terrible and a brutal cost that retreat does not bring safety and weakness does not bring peace.
It is this lesson that has brought us to Viet-Nam. This is a different kind of war. There are no marching armies or solemn declarations. Some citizens of South Viet-Nam at times, with understandable grievances, have joined in the attack on their own government.
But we must not let this mask the central fact that this is really war. It is guided by North Viet-Nam and it is spurred by Communist China. Its goal is to conquer the South, to defeat American power, and to extend the Asiatic dominion of communism. There are great stakes in the balance. Most of the non-Communist nations of Asia cannot, by themselves and alone, resist the growing might and the grasping ambition of Asian communism.
Our power, therefore, is a very vital shield. If we are driven from the field in Viet-Nam, then no nation can ever again have the same confidence in American promise, or in American protection.
In each land the forces of independence would be considerably weakened, and an Asia so threatened by Communist domination would certainly imperil the security of the United States itself.
We did not choose to be the guardians at the gate, but there is no one else.
Nor would surrender in Viet-Nam bring peace, because we learned from Hitler at Munich that success only feeds the appetite of aggression. The battle would be renewed in one country and then another country, bringing with it perhaps even larger and crueler conflict, as we have learned from the lessons of history.
Moreover, we are in Viet-Nam to fulfill one of the most solemn pledges of the American Nation. Three Presidents--President Eisenhower, President Kennedy, and your present President--over 11 years have committed themselves and have promised to help defend this small and valiant nation.
Strengthened by that promise, the people of South Viet-Nam have fought for many long years. Thousands of them have died. Thousands more have been crippled and scarred by war. We just cannot now dishonor our word, or abandon our commitment, or leave those who believed us and who trusted us to the terror and repression and murder that would follow.
This, then, my fellow Americans, is why we are in Viet-Nam.
My fellow Americans:
Once again in man's age-old struggle for a better life and a world of peace, the wisdom, courage, and compassion of the American people are being put to the test. This is the meaning of the tragic conflict in Vietnam.
In meeting the present challenge, it is essential that our people seek understanding, and that our leaders speak with candor.
I have therefore directed that this report to the American people be compiled and widely distributed. In its pages you will find statements on Vietnam by three leaders of your Government--by your President, your Secretary of State, and your Secretary of Defense.
These statements were prepared for different audiences, and they reflect the differing responsibilities of each speaker. The congressional testimony has been edited to avoid undue repetition and to incorporate the sense of the discussions that ensued.
Together, they construct a clear definition of America's role in the Vietnam conflict:
the dangers and hopes that Vietnam holds for all free men
the fullness and limits of our national objectives in a war we did not seek
the constant effort on our part to bring this war we do not desire to a quick and honorable end.
What are our goals in that war-strained land?
First, we intend to convince the Communists that we cannot be defeated by force of arms or by superior power. They are not easily convinced. In recent months they have greatly increased their fighting forces and their attacks and the number of incidents.
I have asked the Commanding General, General Westmoreland, what more he needs to meet this mounting aggression. He has told me. We will meet his needs.
I have today ordered to Viet-Nam the Air Mobile Division and certain other forces which will raise our fighting strength from 75,000 to 125,000 men almost immediately. Additional forces will be needed later, and they will be sent as requested.
This will make it necessary to increase our active fighting forces by raising the monthly draft call from 17,000 over a period of time to 35,000 per month, and for us to step up our campaign for voluntary enlistments.
After this past week of deliberations, I have concluded that it is not essential to order Reserve units into service now. If that necessity should later be indicated, I will give the matter most careful consideration and I will give the country--you--an adequate notice before taking such action, but only after full preparations.
We have also discussed with the Government of South Viet-Nam lately, the steps that we will take to substantially increase their own effort, both on the battlefield and toward reform and progress in the villages. Ambassador Lodge is now formulating a new program to be tested upon his return to that area.
These steps, like our actions in the past, are carefully measured to do what must be done to bring an end to aggression and a peaceful settlement.
We do not want an expanding struggle with consequences that no one can perceive, nor will we bluster or bully or flaunt our power, but we will not surrender and we will not retreat.
For behind our American pledge lies the determination and resources, I believe, of all of the American Nation.
Second, once the Communists know, as we know, that a violent solution is impossible, then a peaceful solution is inevitable.
We are ready now, as we have always been, to move from the battlefield to the conference table. I have stated publicly and many times, again and again, America's willingness to begin unconditional discussions with any government, at any place, at any time. Fifteen efforts have been made to start these discussions with the help of 40 nations throughout the world, but there has been no answer.
But we are going to continue to persist, if persist we must, until death and desolation have led to the same conference table where others could now join us at a much smaller cost.
Let me also add now a personal note. I do not find it easy to send the flower of our youth, our finest young men, into battle. I have spoken to you today of the divisions and the forces and the battalions and the units, but I know them all, every one. I have seen them in a thousand streets, of a hundred towns, in every State in this Union--working and laughing and building, and filled with hope and life. I think I know, too, how their mothers weep and how their families sorrow.
This is the most agonizing and the most painful duty of your President.
There is something else, too. When I was young, poverty was so common that we didn't know it had a name. An education was something that you had to fight for, and water was really life itself. I have now been in public life 35 years, more than three decades, and in each of those 35 years I have seen good men, and wise leaders, struggle to bring the blessings of this land to all of our people.
And now I am the President. It is now my opportunity to help every child get an education, to help every Negro and every American citizen have an equal opportunity, to have every family get a decent home, and to help bring healing to the sick and dignity to the old.
As I have said before, that is what I have lived for, that is what I have wanted all my life since I was a little boy, and I do not want to see all those hopes and all those dreams of so many people for so many years now drowned in the wasteful ravages of cruel wars. I am going to do all I can do to see that that never happens.
But I also know, as a realistic public servant, that as long as there are men who hate and destroy, we must have the courage to resist, or we will see it all, all that we have built, all that we hope to build, all of our dreams for freedom--all, all will be swept away on the flood of conquest.
So, too, this shall not happen. We will stand in Vietnam.
John Foster Dulles: 'Free people will never remain free if they are not willing to fight', On the Fall of Dien Bien Phu - 1954
7 May 1954, Washington DC, USA
A few hours ago, Dien Bien Phu has fallen. Its defense of fifty-seven days and nights will go down in history as one of the most heroic of all time. The defenders composed of French and native forces, inflicted staggering losses on the enemy. And the French soldiers showed that they have not lost either the will or the skill to fight even under the most terrible conditions. And it showed that Vietnam can produce soldiers who have the qualities needed to enable them to defend their country. An epic battle has ended. But great causes have before now been won out of lost battles. The Chinese communists have been supplying the forces of the Viet Minh rebels with munitions and trucks and anti-aircraft guns, radar, technical equipment and technical advisers. They have, however, stopped short of open armed intervention. And in this respect, they may have been deterred by the warnings which the United States has given that such open intervention would lead to grave consequences which might not be confined to Indochina. Accordingly, we are ready to take part with the other countries principally concerned in an examination of the possibility of establishing a collective defense within the framework of the Charter of the United Nations to seek the peace, security and freedom of Southeast Asia and the Western Pacific. And I feel that that unity of purpose still persists. And that such a tragic event as the fall of Dien Bien Phu will harden, and not weaken our purpose to stay united. Today the United States and the other countries immediately concerned are giving careful consideration to the establishment of a collective defense. Conversations are taking place among us. There are many problems; we must agree on just who will take part in the united defense effort and just what the different commitments will be.
An also I frankly recognize that difficulties have been encountered. But also I say that this was to be expected. Because the complexity of the problem is great, so great indeed that as I pointed out it was only possible in the last few months even to get started on this project. And under all the circumstances, I feel that very good progress is being made. And I feel confident that the outcome will be such that Communist aggression will not be able to gain in Southeast Asia the results that it seeks.
This common defense may involve serious commitments by us all. But free people will never remain free if they are not willing, if need be, to fight for their vital interests. Furthermore, vitals interests can no longer be protected merely by local defense. The key to successful defense, and the key to deterring attack is association with others for mutual defense. That is what the United States seeks in Southeast Asia.